Recent research developments in common-pool resource models emphasize the importance of links with ecological systems and the presence of non-linearities, thresholds and multiple steady states. In a recent paper Kossioris et al. (2008) develop a methodology for deriving feedback Nash equilibria for non-linear differential games and apply this methodology to a common-pool resource model of a lake where pollution corresponds to benefits and at the same time affects the ecosystem services. This paper studies the structure of optimal state-dependent taxes that steer the combined economic-ecological system towards the trajectory of optimal management, and provides an algorithm for calculating such taxes.
Introduction
Recent developments in the study of common-pool resources embedded in ecological systems stress the presence of thresholds, multiple steady states and hysteresis effects, which are empirically observable features in these ecosystems, as opposed to the traditional approach of simple linear dynamics. Good examples are lakes, grasslands and coral reef systems.
1 In these systems many agents with potentially diverse objectives interact within the ecosystem and take actions which affect its dynamic behavior and long-run equilibrium. It follows that in the presence of complex dynamics, the socially optimal management of these ecosystems which is attained through cooperative behavior, and the characterization of outcomes under non-cooperative behavior have to be reconsidered. The basic methodology for this must be able to handle complex dynamics as well as strategic interaction between users of the resource. In recent papers, Brock and Starrett (2003) , Mäler et al. (2003) and Kossioris et al. (2008) develop methodologies for analyzing the socially optimal (or cooperative) and the non-cooperative outcomes of ecosystems characterized by non-linear dynamics. In particular Kossioris et al. (2008) derived feedback Nash equilibria (FBNE) for non-linear differential games and applied this methodology to a model for lakes where pollution affects the ecosystem services. The main result of this analysis was that the socially optimal management solution and the best non-cooperative solution differ in terms of steady-state outcomes, paths towards the steady state and total welfare. The FBNE outcome is inferior to the optimal management outcome, in the sense that the steady-state accumulation of pollution is higher and the welfare lower at the FBNE relative to the optimal management. This result suggests that regulation is required in order to improve upon the unregulated FBNE outcome. This, however, raises the methodological issue of designing regulation of non-linear differential games. This problem has been analyzed in Mäler et al. (2003) for non-linear differential games with open-loop information structure, but has not been studied, as far as we know, for non-linear differential games with feedback information structure. The purpose of this paper is to consider whether optimal regulation in the form of taxation can be designed for nonlinear differential games with feedback information structure, which models interactions in economic-ecological systems of common-pool resources characterized by complex dynamics. We study optimal taxation in the sense of deriving a tax scheme which depends on the state of the system (i.e. the stock of pollution) at each point in time and which has the property of steering the regulated system to the socially optimal steady state. The structure of this general statedependent tax rate is determined in the context of a differential game with non-linear objective, with state dynamics characterized by convex-concave feedbacks, and with solutions defined in terms of non-linear feedback Nash equilibrium strategies. We show that the non-linear feedback Nash equilibrium strategies and the optimal state-dependent tax should jointly satisfy a non-linear differential equation which is derived from the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation of the dynamic programming representation of the non-linear differential game. Furthermore, we calculate, using a specific algorithm, the optimal state-dependent tax in four different functional forms: a tax scheme with a fixed rate, a tax scheme with a tax rate proportional to the state of the system, a tax scheme which is a quadratic function of the state, and a tax scheme which is a cubic function of the state. We study this problem in detail for the non-linear state dynamic specification corresponding to the lake problem. Benchekroun and Long (1998) studied the optimal taxation of a polluting oligopoly using a state-dependent tax rate, in the context of a differential game with linear dynamics and concave objective. Their specific results for the case of feedback Nash equilibria focus on linear-quadratic problems and linear feedback strategies. In this paper we study not only a more general problem but also a problem which represents the nonlinear dynamics characterizing common-pool resources.
Regulation of non-linear differential games
We consider the class of non-linear differential games studied by Mäler et al. (2003) and Kossioris et al. (2008) . Consider a situation where n economic agents take actions a i , i ¼ 1,2, . . . ,n, at each point in time t, with which they affect the state of a natural system that is shared by all the agents. The natural system is characterized by thresholds, hysteresis, and irreversibilities, which could lead to the type of regime shifts which have been extensively studied in lake ecosystems.
2 In the context of the analysis of the lake ecosystems, these actions would be phosphorus loadings into the lake due to agricultural activities, while the economic agents are communities concerned about the eutrophication of the lake that they share. The action a i generates benefits according to a strictly increasing and concave utility function Uða i Þ, which is assumed to be the same for all agents. The evolution of the pollutant in the natural system is described by the non-linear transition equation:
In the lake context the state variable x is interpreted as accumulated phosphorus in a lake. Besides the standard linear degradation term Àbx, non-linear feedbacks occur that are represented by the function f(x), which is an increasing nonlinear function of the state variable x. Following the standard literature (e.g. Mäler et al., 2003) the function f(x) is a convex-concave function with a switching point in between, where f 0 ðxÞ is maximal. The stock of pollutants x causes environmental damage (or equivalently, reduces the flow of useful services generated by the natural system) according to a strictly increasing and convex damage function D(x), which is also assumed to be the same for all agents. It follows that the flow of net benefits accruing to each agent at each point in time is given by Uða i ðtÞÞÀDðxðtÞÞ. Each agent chooses a strategy a i in order to maximize the present value of net benefits over an infinite time horizon, or
subject to (1), where r40 is a discount rate, common for all agents.
The game aspect is standard: all actions add to the public bad, so that each agent generates a negative externality for the other agents. Three types of solutions are regarded as important for this game. A solution corresponding to the socially optimal management (SOM), where strategies fa 1 ,a 2 , . . . ,a n g are chosen to maximize the sum of agents' net benefits, and two non-cooperative solutions which correspond to the open-loop Nash equilibrium (OLNE) and the feedback Nash equilibrium (FBNE). If SOM is regarded as the socially desirable solution, deviations of the paths for the state and the control variables for OLNE or FBNE from the corresponding paths for SOM call for regulation. Regulation should induce the OLNE or the FBNE of the regulated agents to converge in some well-defined way to the SOM solution.
Optimal taxation in non-linear differential games
We consider the attainment of the SOM solution by a decentralized scheme which consists of a state-dependent tax tðxÞ on individual phosphorous loadings. To characterize this tax we need a description of the three solutions described above.
The SOM solution requires choosing the set of strategies fa 1 ,a 2 , . . . ,a n g in order to maximize the sum of individual net benefits, or max fa 1 ð:Þ,...,anð:Þg
subject to (1). The current-value Hamiltonian H for this problem is given by
and Pontryagin's maximum principle yields the necessary conditions. In (4), the costate variable l should be interpreted as the social shadow cost of accumulated phosphorous. Assuming UðaÞ ¼ ln a, DðxÞ ¼ cx 2 ,c 4 0, where c stands for the relative weight attached to damage in relation with utility, and following Mäler et al. (2003) , the state-control system which is defined in the state-control space (x,a) for the optimal control problem associated with SOM is
where a denotes the total loadings of all the agents together. As it is shown in Brock and Starrett (2003) , under the assumptions made on the Uða i Þ, D(x) and f(x) functions, this state-control system has an odd number of steady states. The first and the last steady states are locally stable. The locally stable steady states have the saddle-point property with a onedimensional globally stable manifold, and the locally unstable steady states, with possibly complex eigenvalues, lie between two locally stable steady states. A candidate local socially optimal steady state (OSS) ðx n ,a n Þ (Kiseleva and Wagener, 2010 ) is defined as a solution of the system:
The solution corresponding to the OLNE of this game is obtained in a straightforward way by applying Pontryagin's maximum principle to the individual optimal control problems (2). The state-control system under symmetry, in the statecontrol space (x,a), is
while a candidate open-loop Nash equilibrium steady state (OLNE-SS) ðx OL ,a OL Þ is defined as a solution of the system:
Candidate OLNE-SSs have the same properties as candidate OSSs. There are an odd number of steady states, the first and the last steady states are locally stable with the saddle-point property, and the locally unstable steady states lie between two locally stable steady states. This similarity between the SOM solution and the OLNE can easily be verified by comparing (8) and (12), which show that the OSS is a special case of the OLNE-SS for n¼1.
Comparing the state-control systems and the steady-state conditions for SOM and OLNE, it is clear that the two solutions differ. Thus regulation is required since the OLNE is inferior to the SOM solution and the aim is to approach the SOM solution. As shown by Mäler et al. (2003) , the steady-state concentration of phosphorus is higher at the OLNE-SS relative to the OSS. This calls for a regulatory scheme which would induce the agents to choose loadings so that the SOM solution is attained. Mäler et al. (2003) show that in order to obtain the loading that corresponds to SOM, the tax on loading should be chosen such that tðtÞ ¼ ÀlðtÞþl OL ðtÞ. This implies that the tax bridges the gap between the social shadow cost of the accumulated phosphorus lðtÞ and the private shadow cost of the accumulated phosphorus l OL ðtÞ at the OLNE, which causes the steady-state phosphorus levels in the OLNE to exceed the (unique) steady-state phosphorus level under optimal management. The tax rate, however, is time-dependent, since it has to equalize cooperative and noncooperative loading at every point in time. Mäler et al. (2003) studied in detail a simpler tax scheme, consisting of a fixed tax rate on loading. This fixed time-independent tax is called optimal steady-state tax (OSST), and when set as
n , the regulated OLNE reaches an OLNE-SS which is the same as the OSS, provided that the number of agents n is sufficiently low.
3
The FBNE for the class of non-linear differential games, described by (2), with symmetric and stationary feedback Nash equilibrium strategies a i ¼ hðxÞ, i ¼ 1,2, . . . ,n, can be described using Pontryagin's maximum principle and a state-control system representation or by using dynamic programming and the resulting Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation in the value function V. The current-value Hamiltonian characterizing the FBNE is given by
The state-control system, in the state-control space (x,a) is
while a candidate feedback Nash equilibrium steady state (FBNE-SS) ðx FB ,a FB Þ is defined as the solution of the system
Comparing (16), (18) with (10), (12) suggests that the OLNE is a special case of the FBNE for h 0 ðxÞ ¼ 0. Comparison of the conditions characterizing SOM with the corresponding FBNE conditions suggests that regulation is required. The Hamiltonian formulation reveals the deviations between SOM and FBNE and the need for regulation if the FBNE is 'worse' than the SOM solution. The Hamiltonian formulation is, however, not as useful for determining the optimal tax tðtÞ ¼ ÀlðtÞþl FB ðtÞ, as in the case of regulating the OLNE. This is because it is difficult to determine l FB ðtÞ due to the presence of the unknown feedback Nash equilibrium strategies a i ¼ hðxÞ, which should emerge as part of the solution of the problem. In order to overcome this difficulty we choose to use the dynamic programming approach for determining the optimal tax.
Non-linear feedback strategies and the optimal steady-state tax
The feedback Nash equilibrium strategies for the unregulated non-linear differential game described by (2) have been recently obtained by Kossioris et al. (2008) , using the dynamic programming approach. It is shown in that paper that for the non-linear differential game described by (2), the steady state of the best feedback Nash equilibrium is not necessarily close to the OSS. Moreover, the paper shows that even if these steady states are close, the value of the corresponding feedback Nash equilibrium is generally much worse than the value of optimal management. Thus regulation is required to approach the SOM outcome in some well-defined way. In our case we require that the regulation is implemented by a state-dependent tax on loadings which is designed in a way such that the regulated system attains in the long run the desired optimal steady state of the SOM solution.
In order to study this type of regulation in the non-linear differential game, we start with the HJB equation of each agent i for the problem without regulation. The HJB equation for the unregulated problem is
Regulation is introduced in the form of a time-stationary tax rate per unit loading a i which depends on the state of the system. The tax rate is defined as tðxÞ. Under the state-dependent tax the HJB equation becomes rVðxÞ ¼ max
The optimality condition is
In equilibrium a i ¼ hðxÞ, so that 
By differentiating (20) with respect to x, using the optimality conditions (22) and (23) Since b is a parameter vector in (25), general theorems on the solutions of differential equations suggest that the solution of (25) will depend on this vector. Let hðx,bÞ be such a solution. For an initial value x ¼ x 0 , the values for the feedback Nash equilibria, for each agent, are given by
where x f is a steady state and hðx,bÞ is the solution of the differential equation (25), with boundary condition:
and x(t) is the solution of the differential equation:
Note that not every steady-state x f has to be stable. Furthermore, note that a stable steady-state x f may not be reachable from any initial state x 0 because the solution hðx 0 ,bÞ may steer the system away from x f instead of towards x f (see also Kossioris et al., 2008) . In general not every steady-state x f can be reached from any initial state x 0 for a given tðxÞ. Eq. (25) with boundary condition (28) does not have in general a globally defined solution in the relevant computational domain of interest for x because of the term within the brackets on the left-hand side of (25). This term can become zero at a certain point for a given choice of the function tðxÞ. This leads to a blow up of the slope of the solution h(x) at such point. This is more clear in the case that tðxÞ is identically zero; see Fig. 5 and related comments in Kossioris et al. (2008) . The behavior of the solution of (25) with general tðxÞ is completely analogous. Moreover, not every steady-state x f is necessarily stable.
That is why in the proposed algorithm we choose only the stable x f s. If, however, a number of stable steady states can be reached from some initial state x 0 for a given tax tðxÞ, it is assumed that the agents will be able to coordinate on the best regulated feedback Nash equilibrium, in the sense of attaining the maximum value (27), if it exists. Thus the regulator sets the tax scheme and the agents, by taking the scheme as given, coordinate on a non-linear feedback Nash equilibrium profile hðx,bÞ which converges to a steady-state x f and maximizes the value (27). This means that in this case the value will be only a function of the initial state and the tax parameters b:
where x f must be stable and reachable from x 0 , and where it is assumed that the maximum exists.
Let x 0 be a given initial state and let x n be the optimal steady state which corresponds to the SOM solution, then an optimal steady-state tax function (OSSTF) can be defined as follows.
Definition 1 (OSSTF). Assume that a state-dependent tax function t n ðxÞ exists, for which the corresponding best regulated feedback Nash equilibrium h n ðx,b n Þ generates a path that converges, starting from x 0 , to the FBNE-SS x f which is equal to x n . 5 This tax function is called the optimal steady-state tax function.
In this sense the specific tax function t n ðxÞ and the regulated feedback strategies h n ðx,b n Þ reproduce the OSS of the SOM solution. The numerical algorithm to determine the best regulated feedback Nash equilibrium and the OSSTF for the lake problem consists of the following steps:
Step1: For each candidate x f and tax parameters b 2 B ¼ ½0,b max , the non-linear ordinary differential equation (25) with boundary condition (28) is solved, with the ode solver ode15s of Matlab (The MathWorks, Inc., 2002) , in the intervals ½p,x f and ½x f ,q, where p and q are chosen appropriately, and the hðx,bÞ profile is determined.
Step2: The numerical solution for hðx,bÞ is used to solve the transition equation (29) in the interval ½0,T, where T is chosen appropriately.
Step3: The value (27) is computed, using a Matlab quad function.
Step4: The value is maximized over the set of admissible x f , according to (30).
Step5a: If the tax function corresponds to a fixed tax t 0 ðxÞ ¼ b 0 or to a tax that is proportional to the current state t 1 ðxÞ ¼ b 1 x (i.e. the state-dependent tax is determined by a single parameter b j , j¼ 0 or 1), then we proceed as follows. We construct the relationship x f ¼ fðb j Þ, j¼ 0 or 1, that determines the FBNE-SS which can be reached from a given initial state x 0 with the best regulated feedback Nash equilibrium when the tax function is t 0 ðxÞ ¼ b 0 or t 1 ðxÞ ¼ b 1 x. Since we search for a tax function that will steer the regulated system to the SOM steady-state x n , the parameter of the OSSTF should satisfy x n ¼ fðb n j Þ, j ¼0 or 1. If x n is in the domain of f, the OSSTF will be t Step5b: If the tax function corresponds to the quadratic function t 2 ðxÞ ¼ b 1 x þ b 2 x 2 (i.e. the state-dependent tax is determined by the parameter vector ðb 1 ,b 2 Þ), or the cubic tax function t 3 ðxÞ ¼ b 1 x þb 2 x 2 þb 3 x 3 (i.e. the state-dependent tax is determined by the parameter vector ðb 1 ,b 2 ,b 3 Þ) then we proceed as follows. Provided that the set of x f in step 4 contains x n , we construct for the quadratic case the contour cðb 1 ,b 2 Þ ¼ x n which describes combinations of the tax function parameters ðb 1 ,b 2 Þ that attain the SOM steady-state x n , and for the cubic case the corresponding isosurface
We choose from theses isolines as parameters of the OSSTF, the pair ðb 
The OSSTF will be t n 2 ðxÞ ¼ b
It is straightforward, although computationally very demanding, to define the algorithm for tax functions with more than four parameters. If a set of values for the parameter vector leads to the desired steady state, the regulator chooses the element of this set that maximizes social welfare.
Numerical results
In order to be able to compare our results with the earlier results of Mäler et al. (2003) and Kossioris et al. (2008) , the basic parameters are fixed at the same values as in these studies: b¼ 0.6, r ¼ 0:03, c¼1 and n¼2. For these parameter values the saddle-point stable optimal steady state for SOM is x n ¼ 0:353, while the socially optimal steady-state phosphorous loading is a n ¼ 0:101. Thus the open-loop OSST is t n OL ¼ ðnÀ1Þ=0:101 which means, for example, that for n ¼ 2 a regulated OLNE with t n OL ¼ 1=0:101 C9:9 will converge in the long run, along the stable manifold, to the OSS x n ¼ 0:353 as shown in Mäler et al. (2003) . In order to study the structure of the optimal tax function, for the feedback Nash equilibrium, we set the initial state at x 0 ¼ 0:6 which implies a steady state for the unregulated FBNE x f ¼ 0:3825. This initial state is well above the OSS x n ¼ 0:353, so that the OSSTF indeed has to steer the system towards the OSS. 7 We examine four cases for the OSSTF, the fixed tax t 0 ðxÞ ¼ b 0 , the proportional tax t 1 ðxÞ ¼ b 1 x, the quadratic tax t 2 ðxÞ ¼ b 1 x þ b 2 x 2 , and the cubic tax t 3 ðxÞ ¼ b 1 x þ b 2 x 2 þb 3 x 3 . We do not consider a linear state-dependent tax of the form b 0 þ b 1 x, because this would imply that even if the stock of pollution would be almost zero, emissions would be taxed at the state independent rate b 0 . Since we know that the fixed state independent tax is a second best tax we choose state-dependent taxes tðxÞ with the property that tð0Þ ¼ 0.
The fixed tax
In Fig. 1 , the inverse of the x f ¼ fðb 0 Þ relationship described in step 5a of the algorithm is presented. 5 Note that x n may depend on x 0 . 6 In the numerical results of the following section, the extraction of isolines, for the quadratic tax case, or isosurfaces in the cubic tax case was done using a custom implementation of the marching squares/cubes algorithm of Lorensen and Cline (1987) . 7 We consider the interval (0,1) as our computational domain. This domain catches the characteristics of the problem since it contains the reference steady states. Our results remain valid in the larger domains (0,2) and (0,3).
The relationship has the expected negative slope indicating that the higher the tax parameter, the lower the FBNE-SS.
The cross in Fig. 1 indicates the OSSTF b 0 ¼ 5:9 which attains the desired socially optimal steady-state x n ¼ 0:353. Fig. 2 presents feedback profiles hðx,b 0 Þ for the data of Fig. 1 . The dashed line corresponds to the regulated profile with fixed tax t n ¼ 5:9, and the value for x n ¼ 0:353 is indicated by the square. The solid line corresponds to b 0 ¼ 0, which means that this profile corresponds to the unregulated FBNE with steady-state x f ¼ 0:3825 (the value of this profile at the steady state is indicated by the circle). Both the regulated and the unregulated steady states are stable. Fig. 3 shows the time path of the phosphorous stock under the fixed tax (dashed line) towards x n ¼ 0:353, along with the path corresponding to the unregulated equilibrium (solid line) converging to x f ¼ 0:3825.
The regulated social welfare for each player under the fixed tax, as defined by (31), is SWj b 0 ¼ 5:9 ¼ À108:018644.
The proportional tax
Following again step 5a of the algorithm, the proportional tax that attains x n ¼ 0:353 as a regulated steady state is b 1 ¼ 4:4. The x f ¼ fðb 1 Þ relationship, the regulated, and unregulated feedback profiles and state paths are similar to the paths corresponding to the fixed tax (Figs. 1-3) . The comparison will follow below in Section 3.2.5. The regulated steady This combination can therefore be considered as the optimal quadratic tax scheme that attains x n ¼ 0:353 as the regulated steady state. The quadratic tax is an improvement in terms of social welfare relative to the fixed tax and the proportional tax.
The cubic tax
Following again step 5b of the algorithm the welfare maximizing triplet is ðb Comparisons among the tax schemes are presented in the following Section 3.2.5. 
Summary of numerical results
Our numerical results are summarized in Table 1 . Table 1 presents social welfare per individual for the SOM solution, the unregulated feedback Nash equilibrium and the regulated feedback Nash equilibrium for the fixed, the proportional and the quadratic tax.
The second column of this table shows that the difference in social welfare between e.g. ''unregulated'' and ''fixed tax'' is 46.6% of the difference between ''unregulated'' and ''social optimum'', while the difference between ''unregulated'' and ''quadratic tax'' is 55.2% of the difference between ''unregulated'' and ''social optimum'' and the difference between ''unregulated'' and ''cubic tax'' is 62.2% of the difference between ''unregulated'' and ''social optimum''. Note that all the four tax schemes, by construction, induce the socially optimal steady-state x n ¼ 0:353, but they differ in terms of social welfare. The reason is that the proportional tax moves the trajectory towards the steady state closer to the socially optimal one than the fixed tax, the quadratic tax moves it closer than the proportional tax and the cubic tax moves it even closer. The differences are small but it can be expected that higher-order tax polynomial approximations would move the trajectory further and decrease the gap in social welfare between the SOM solution and the regulated feedback Nash equilibrium. Fig. 5 puts together the hðxÞ profiles for the unregulated feedback Nash equilibrium (solid line) and for the fixed, linear, quadratic and cubic tax cases (other lines, at the right from top to bottom, respectively).
The comparison shows that for states higher than the socially optimal steady-state x n ¼ 0:353, loadings decrease as we move from the fixed tax to the cubic tax. As is to be expected, unregulated loadings are the highest. Finally, Fig. 6 puts together the time paths of the phosphorus stock for the cases of socially optimal management (lower solid line), unregulated feedback Nash equilibrium (upper solid line) and regulated feedback Nash equilibria with fixed, linear, quadratic, and cubic taxes, respectively.
The upper path in Fig. 6 corresponds to the unregulated feedback equilibrium and converges to the steady-state x f ¼ 0:3825. The next four paths (close together) correspond, starting from the top to the fixed, linear, quadratic, and cubic tax cases. All these paths converge to the socially optimal steady-state x n ¼ 0:353. The lower path is the one corresponding to socially optimal management. We observe that the optimal management path converges very fast to the socially optimal steady-state x n ¼ 0:353: convergence is almost complete for t 425. The regulated paths also converge to the socially optimal steady state, but they converge in large time, that is convergence is almost complete for t 42000.
8 Thus the regulated paths converge to the socially optimal steady state much slower relative to the optimal path. The deviation between the socially optimal path and the regulated paths can be regarded as a measure of inefficiency of the specific regulatory scheme to attain the social optimum. This inefficiency is reduced as we move from fixed to cubic taxes. It is to be expected that higher-order tax schemes will reduce this inefficiency further. To explore possible dependence of the estimated tax functions on the initial condition x 0 we proceed by computing the linear, quadratic and the cubic OSSTFs t n j ðx; x 0 Þ, j ¼ 1,2,3, which steer the system towards x n ¼ 0:353 and maximize welfare, for initial conditions ranging from 0.35 to 0.85 in steps of 0.05. In Fig. 7 we plot the graphs of these functions for the initial state of x 0 ¼ 0:6 and in Fig. 8 we plot the corresponding graphs for all the different initial conditions (including x 0 ¼ 0:6Þ where circle, square, and star marks, correspond to proportional, quadratic and cubic tax functions, respectively. These results suggest that the OSSTFs are very close to each other over the considered range of initial conditions and subsequently their dependence on the initial conditions is weak. 9 Since we rely on numerical results, we cannot exclude the possibility of a stronger dependence on initial conditions (which would raise time consistency concerns) for problems with a different structure and parametrization. We think, however, that for the specific class of problems that we analyze, it is fair to conclude that the dependence of the calculated OSSTF on initial conditions is very weak.
Concluding remarks
This paper considers regulation of common-pool resources characterized by complex dynamics. This requires solving for the feedback Nash equilibrium of a non-linear differential game under an appropriate tax scheme. The HamiltonJacobi-Bellman equation for this problem leads to a complicated ordinary differential equation that has to be solved. A numerical algorithm is developed for a fixed tax, a proportional tax, a quadratic tax, and a cubic tax and the algorithm is applied to the model of the lake as a metaphor for this type of models. It should be noted that because the OSS is treated as a fixed parameter in the determination of the tax scheme, our method can also be used to derive state-dependent tax functions which could steer the system from a high unregulated steady state to an arbitrary lower steady state, provided of course that a solution exists. In this paper we focus on the attainment of the OSS, and we do not consider the attainment of arbitrarily defined steady states. Assume, however, that we consider an arbitrary state x 0 as an observed unregulated steady state with high accumulated phosphorus and the target is to steer the system to an arbitrary low phosphorus concentrationx. In this case the algorithm described in the paper can be used to derive state-dependent tax functions (fixed, proportional, quadratic or cubic) that would steer the system tox, by replacing x n withx in the application of the algorithm. Further study of this problem could address more complicated tax schemes as well as the impact on the solution from increasing the number of agents n.
